COP26 as seen from Pakistan
As part of our series of articles on COP26 as seen from different places (earlier articles have covered COP26 as seen from Kenya, Glasgow, South Korea, India and Bhutan), we are pleased to be able to share this article from energy and environmental lawyer Maroof Mittha. It sets out his views and his perspectives on COP26 and climate issues affecting Pakistan, and in particular the issue of climate impacts on water supplies and the water resources of the Indus Basin.
Climate Change, Pakistan, and issues of water supply and groundwater in the Indus Basin
Paris Agreement on Climate Change
The Paris Agreement made the world agree to confine the global temperatures rise to well below 2.0°C compared to pre-industrial times and to pursue efforts to limit it to 1.5°C above pre-industrial times. All eyes have been on the Conference of Parties (COP26), in Glasgow (UK), to deliver the promises made in Paris.
The situation has gained more prominence because of alarms raised by the Working Group of Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) findings. IPCC’s Working Group report has projected an earlier temperature rise to the minimum threshold of 1.5°C, and it insisted on rapid national and global actions to mitigate the effects of global warming. Considerable attention is drawn to all international and national actions and strategies outlined in the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).
This article is an overview of Pakistan’s actions about the climate change impact on its water resources.
Pakistan and climate change
Pakistan is home to over two hundred and twenty million people living in the geographical area of 881,913Km2. Pakistan also possesses a diverse landscape through glacial reserves on the Karakoram, the Himalayas, Hindukush (up north) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and cultivable land and deserts of Punjab and Sindh with mineral reserves in Balochistan. The data on the impact of climate change present a worrying concern for Pakistan.
Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND Gain) data developed by the University of Notre Dame to help prioritise climate action identifies Pakistan at thirty-ninth position for its vulnerability to climate change. The data rings alarms about the dangerous position of Pakistan to face the events of climate change. It further places Pakistan in the twenty-seventh position for its least readiness to face the climate changes stating an evident lack of preparedness on the part of Pakistan.[See Note 1 - bottom of page]
Studies on physical effects of climate change in Pakistan have highlighted that the climate-change-related occurrences in Pakistan would be severe, intense and frequent. Rasul et al. point to a rapid glacial meltdown in the Karakoram, Himalayas, Hindukush. The authors noted that these glacial meltdowns in the Himalayan range were happening faster than ever recorded.[2] The other physical effects include ‘abrupt rainfalls, unpredictable flooding, droughts, varying temperature, lack of water sources.’[3] In addition to the above, Pakistan is still going through a troubling time for the economy. World Bank data reported that the annual growth rate of Pakistan plunged to 0.5% immediately after the Covid 19 pandemic.[4]
Pakistan’s water resources and the Indus Basin
The situation raises concerns about the viability of Pakistan’s major water resources and their exposure to climate change. Pakistan, geographically, shares the Indus Basin with India, China, and Afghanistan and on the downstream occupies approximately 65% of this transboundary Indus Basin.[5]
The Indus Basin was developed into an efficient canal and irrigation system during the British Raj to develop undivided Punjab as the crop-producing state. The developed irrigation system also landed undivided Punjab in trouble with other neighbouring states even before the partition of India in 1947. However, the disputes remained unresolved at the partition and soon escalated into an international dispute between India and Pakistan. The international problem was avoided through a bilateral international agreement, i.e., the Indus Water Treaty, mediated by the World Bank. The Treaty allocated the rivers between Pakistan and India, giving Pakistan access to the western rivers, i.e., Jhelum, Sindh and Chenab. The Treaty has survived more than six decades between the two countries.
The Indus Basin forms the primary source of water for Pakistan. Qureshi highlighted that the Indus Basin supplies water for approximately 90% of Pakistan’s food production.[6] The data also points out that agriculture, forestry, and fishing contribute approximately 22% to the national GDP (employing 45% of the labour force)[7], indicating national reliance on the available water resources.[8] These statistics illustrate the significance of these water dependant economic activities to Pakistan’s economy. This heavy reliance on the Indus Basin also marks the significance of the bilateral water treaty for Pakistan.
Basharat (2019) stated that the Indus River would annually bring 180 billion cubic meters (BCM) water to Pakistani part of the Indus Basin. From this water resource, it was estimated that the irrigation system consumed annually about 128 BCM.[9] The author also stated an average groundwater consumption of 50-60 BCM, which was stated as the most extensive groundwater draft by any state after India, China, and the US.[10]
It has been reported that Pakistan possesses an installed water storage capacity of 14.46 million-acre-feet (MAF) which makes about 10% of its annual inflows, estimated to give a storage capacity of almost thirty days.[11] Pakistan’s water resources management and storage issues, overdraft and contamination of the groundwater, urbanisation and dense population also add to water stress aggravated by climate change.
Pakistan’s Nationally Determined Contribution under the Paris Agreement
In its recently issued National Determined Contribution 2021 (the Updated NDC), Pakistan has proposed the use of nature-based solutions to its climate change challenges. To deal with its water issues Pakistan in collaboration with international partners, has suggested a project, ‘Recharge Pakistan.’ An illustration of Pakistan’s goals and actions as described in the Updated NDC is in Figure 1 below.
A concept paper issued by the Green Climate Foundation details some insight into the ‘Recharge Pakistan.’ It asserts that this program will ‘increase water storage and recharge through wetlands, floodplains, and hill-torrents management; promote climate-adapted community-based natural resource management and livelihoods….’[13]
The updated NDCs submitted by Pakistan also indicate that the government has allocated Rupees Six Billion (Thirty-Five Million US Dollars approximately) to commence work on three out of six proposed recharge sites.
The paper mentioned in the preceding paragraph also explains that this recharge of Pakistan’s water resources will contribute to the additional reservoir capacity through development of small storages on run of the rivers. It further elaoborates that this recharge is to be done by regulating water discharges in these developed small storages sites on rivers during high floods and peak flows in these rivers. These recharge sites where the storage capacity is to be developed include Manchar & Hamal wetland, Taunsa pond area, and Dera Ismail Khan in Pakistan. A map of proposed sites is described in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2: An illustration of recharge sites for Recharge Pakistan [14]
Figure 3: Illustrative map of groundwater sources in Indus Basin[16]
The official accounts of Recharge Pakistan send a positive signal towards a possible solution to water shortage and flood management concerns. The project’s progress indicates an internal solution for issues with surface water management. However, the concerns about the consumption and use of transboundary groundwater remain unattended. The unconfined transboundary groundwater/aquifer in Indus Basin comprises an area of 0.16 million km2.[15] An illustration of this unconfined aquifer is described in Figure 3 below.
Legal considerations and water supplies
The connections between the surface water and groundwater in the Indus Basin is unexplored. The Treaty also does not expressly provide mechanisms and provisions to deal with the transboundary groundwater in the Indus Basin. Therefore, no definite conclusion may be drawn about the possible applicability of the Indus Water Treaty on the transboundary groundwater in the Indus Basin.
Pakistan’s national legal framework vests the control over the groundwaters to a federal body, the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA). The provincial irrigation and drainage laws also authorise the maintenance of records for monitoring groundwater activity. But a coherent national policy on this critical issue remains publicly inaccesible.
The august Supreme Court of Pakistan discussed the concerns about depletion and contamination of the groundwater in a public interest litigation case.[17] While emphasising the construction of new water reservoirs, the Supreme Court highlighted the unsustainable use of groundwater caused by unmonitored and unregulated pumping of groundwater. The Court also highlighted the contamination of the groundwaters due to untreated wastes. Nonetheless despite these discussions, groundwater extraction largely remains unregulated. The concerns highlighted in the judgment are yet to be answered by a comprehensive national action.
The lack of an explicit international legal framework on transboundary groundwater in Indus Basin, the efficient national legal and policy framework on extraction, and groundwater contamination add challenges to make water-stressed Pakistan extremely vulnerable to climate change events. The legal framework issues for groundwater regulation must be resolved as the utmost priority, given Pakistan’s water security concerns.
Internationally, COP26 may be taken as an appropriate opportunity to voice and discuss the issue of revisiting the Indus Water Treaty in the context of transboundary groundwater. The climate change clock is ticking more loudly, and all concerned must take this opportunity to make the most of the COP26 to afford water supply for people in the Indus Basin.
Notes
[1] Grantham Research Institute of Climate Change and Environment, 'Pakistan - Cllimate Targets' (Climate Laws - LSE, 2021) <https://climate-laws.org/geographies/pakistan/climate_targets> accessed 31-Oct-2021
[2] Rasul G and others, Climate Change in Pakistan Focused on Sindh Province (2012)
[3] Abid M and others, 'Climate change vulnerability, adaptation and risk perceptions at farm level in Punjab, Pakistan' (2016) 547 Science of The Total Environment 447
[4] WB, 'Pakistan - GDP growth (annual %)' (World bank, 2021) <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=PK> accessed 31-Oct-2021
[5] Watto MA, Mitchell M and Bashir S, Water Resources of Pakistan: Issues and Impacts, vol 9 (Springer Nature 2021), 2
[6] Asad Sarwar Qureshi, 'Water Management in the Indus Basin in Pakistan: Challenges and Opportunities' (2011) 31 Mountain research and development 252
[7] Note 2
[8] WB, 'Agriculture, forestry, and fishing, value added (% of GDP) - Pakistan' (World Bank, 2021) <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS?locations=PK> accessed 31-Oct-2021
[9] Basharat M, 'Chapter 16 - Water Management in the Indus Basin in Pakistan: Challenges and Opportunities' in Khan SI and Adams TE (eds), Indus River Basin (Elsevier 2019)
[10] Qureshi R and Ashraf M, 'Water security issues of agriculture in Pakistan' (2019) 1 PAS Islamabad Pak 41
[11] Note 9
[12] Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Updated Nationally Determined Contribution 2021
[13] Pakistan, Concept Note: Recharge Pakistan: Building Pakistan’s Resilience to Climate Change through Ecosystem-Based Adaptation for Integrated Flood Risk Management (Green Climate Foundation 2019)
[14] Note 13
[15] Muhammad Jehanzeb Masud Cheema and Muhammad Uzair Qamar, 'Transboundary Indus River Basin: Potential Threats to Its Integrity' in Sadiq I. Khan and Thomas E. Adams (eds), Indus River Basin (Elsevier 2019)
[16] International Groundwater Resources Assessment Centre, 'Indus River Plain Aquifer' (iGRACE, 2020) <https://ggis.un-igrac.org/view/tba> accessed 31 Oct 2021
[17] Barrister Zafarullah Khan v. Federation of Pakistan 2018 SCMR 2001 (Supreme Court of Pakistan)